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TILA: THE TEXTUALIST-INTENTIONALIST LITMUS ACT? 
Caroline Hatton* 
 
Statutory interpretation is the Cinderella of legal scholarship.  Once 
scorned and neglected, confined to the kitchen, it now dances in the ballroom.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)2 is a broad, consumer-
protective statute that requires lenders to disclose their terms to 
consumers and governs the manner and timing of this disclosure in a 
range of commercial transactions.  TILA’s rescission provision3 allows 
consumers to annul contracts made without the disclosure TILA 
requires, and its codification as Regulation Z4 prescribes the manner 
in which rescission may be accomplished. 
Courts have found Regulation Z’s prescription unclear and have 
employed different interpretive methodologies to decipher exactly 
what steps consumers must take to rescind.  The Eighth, Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits determined via an intentionalist analysis that 
consumers must file a complaint with the court to effectuate 
rescission.5  The Third and Fourth Circuits, on the other hand, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Rutgers College; 
Ph.D., Yale University.   
 1   WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1 (1994). 
 2  15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2012). 
 3  15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012). 
 4  12 C.F.R. §1026 (2012) (formerly §226). 
 5  Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013); McOmie-Gray v. 
Bank of Am. Homes, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012); Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 
681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012).  The Sixth Circuit has also held that a borrower must 
file a complaint to rescind in a very recent unpublished decision.  See Lumpkin v. 
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 12-2317, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16576, at *7–8 
(6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2013).  The Lumpkin Court, however, states that “[o]ther circuits 
have uniformly interpreted Beach to preclude the precise argument Lumpkin makes 
here” and supports this proposition by citing only Rosenfield, McOmie, and an 
unpublished case from the Third Circuit that has been superseded by Sherzer v. 
Homestar Mortgage Services, 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013).  See id.; see also infra note 
135 (discussing the now-superseded, non-precedential Williams v. Wells Fargo Home 
Mortgage, Inc., 410 F. App’x 495 (3d Cir. 2011)).  The Lumpkin Court then declares 
on the basis of this perceived uniformity that “Lumpkin must not only give notice of 
his intent to rescind—which he failed to do—but also prove in a court of law that he 
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concluded from textualist readings of the statute that borrowers can 
rescind by notifying lenders.6  As district courts around the country 
enter decisions on the matter, the rift created by adherence to these 
two interpretive schools is growing ever deeper.  The Supreme Court 
will undoubtedly determine the procedural requirement for 
rescission under TILA, and will likely address the true nature of the 
Circuit split surrounding the rescission requirement as well. 
That does not mean, however, that the provision is headed for a 
textualist-intentionalist showdown: As this comment argues, this 
methodological conflict masks two less conspicuous but potentially 
dispositive questions whose resolution could obviate the need to favor 
one interpretive school over another.  First, should lower courts be 
bound by conjectural Court dicta; second, should the Court defer to 
the agency that now holds regulatory authority over TILA, although 
that agency did not exist when TILA was codified?  To see how an 
apparent textualist-intentionalist clash holds dramatic consequences 
both for the scope of precedent and for administrative law, it is 
necessary to trace the history of TILA and recent TILA litigation. 
Congress enacted TILA in 1968 to combat deceptive practices by 
predatory lenders that left consumers unaware of the nature of the 
credit obligations they undertook and unable to conduct meaningful 
comparison of offers.7  “[S]uch blind economic activity,” then-Under 
Secretary of the Treasury Joseph Barr explained, “is inconsistent with 
the efficient functioning of a free economic system such as ours.”8 
TILA, an intended remedy for these commercial ills, is 
accordingly broad in scope.  As Senator Paul Douglas announced in 
proposing TILA, “this bill does not provide for judgment solely on 
the basis of the . . . annual interest rate or the total finance charges.  
It also provides that there shall be a statement of the cash price or 
delivery price of the property or service to be acquired.”9  By 
 
has a right to rescind.  His right to bring such a suit has now expired.”  Lumpkin, 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16576, at *8 (citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 
417 (1998)).  As this Comment demonstrates, however, there is no uniformity among 
circuits regarding this issue, nor is it a given that Beach is applicable.  See infra Parts 
II.B. and III.  
 6  See generally Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services, 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013).  Several Judges 
of the Eighth Circuit have filed dissents or concurrences that side with the Third and 
Fourth Circuit; for details, see infra notes 163–182 and accompanying text. 
 7  See Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1973). 
 8  Id. (quoting Hearings on H. R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of 
the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 76 (1967). 
 9  Id. at 367–68 (quoting Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Subcomm. on Production and 
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requiring lenders to disclose both total price and finance charges, 
“the judgment of the consumer can be on the basis of both of these 
factors, not merely on one alone.”10 
TILA’s introductory provision adopts these broad goals of 
enhanced economic stabilization and strengthened “competition 
among the various financial institutions . . . engaged in the extension 
of consumer credit.”11  TILA aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure 
of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more 
readily the various credit terms available to him.”12  This “awareness of 
the cost” of credit will lead to “the informed use of credit” by 
consumers, which, in turn, will strengthen the American economy.13 
Congress framed TILA in general terms to leave room for the 
Federal Reserve Board (the “Board”) to adapt TILA enforcement to 
creditor schemes.  “Congress was clearly aware that merchants could 
evade the reporting requirements of the Act by concealing credit 
charges.  In delegating rulemaking authority to the Board, Congress 
emphasized the Board’s authority to prevent such evasion.”14  The 
Board exercised its sweeping power “by promulgating Regulation Z, 
12 [C.F.R.] Part 226 (1979), which at least partly fills the statutory 
gaps.”15 
Although Regulation Z addresses many modes of consumer 
manipulation, “[e]ven Regulation Z . . . cannot speak explicitly to 
every credit disclosure issue.”16  The Court issued an interpretive 
directive for when neither TILA itself, nor Regulation Z, speaks 
directly to a new strain of consumer deception: “consider the implicit 
character of the statutory scheme.”17  In construing TILA-derived 
causes of action, in other words, courts must be guided by TILA’s 
 
Stabilization of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong. 447–48 (1961) 
(statement of Sen. Douglas)). 
 10  Id. at 368 (quoting Hearings on S. 1740 (statement of Sen. Douglas)). 
 11  15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012). 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 371 (1973).  In fact, the Court 
observed: “[t]o hold that Congress did not intend the Board to take action against 
this type of manipulation would require us to believe that, despite this emphasis, 
Congress intended the obligations established by the Act to be open to evasion by 
subterfuges of which it was fully aware.”  Id.  The Court then firmly rejected this 
possibility: “the language of the enabling provision precludes us from accepting so 
narrow an interpretation of the Board’s power.”  Id.  
 15  Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560 (1980). 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
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consumer-protective purpose. 
In furtherance of its consumer-protective purpose, TILA gives 
borrowers the right to rescind non-compliant loan agreements and 
provides that “[a]n obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three 
years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the 
sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”18  Regulation Z, in turn, 
sets forth specific manners in which borrowers may notify lenders of 
their intent to rescind: 
(2) To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall 
notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, or 
other means of written communication.  Notice is 
considered given when mailed, or when filed for 
telegraphic transmission, or, if sent by other means, when 
delivered to the creditor’s designated place of business.  
(3)  . . .  If the required notice and material disclosures are 
not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after 
the occurrence giving rise to the right of rescission, or upon 
transfer of all of the consumer’s interest in the property, or 
upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first.19 
As detailed as this provision appears, courts are now grappling with 
its scope with some frequency.  In order to trigger rescission within 
the three year limit, what must a consumer do? 
Neither TILA nor Regulation Z answers this question directly.  
Indeed, a key sentence in 12 C.F.R. § 15(a)(2)—”To exercise the 
right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the 
rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of written 
communication.”—is subject to two irreconcilable interpretations: 
either notice is a sufficient condition (as soon as the consumer 
notifies that creditor, the right to rescind has been exercised), or it is 
merely a necessary one (the right to rescind cannot be exercised 
without providing notice to the creditor). 
Courts have tied the necessary-or-sufficient-condition 
determination to a choice of interpretive methodologies, with the 
intentionalists reading the notice as necessary and the textualists 
reading it to be sufficient.20  Curiously, those courts that stress 
congressional intent are the same courts that limit consumer 
rescission to preserve clarity of title,21 a stance seemingly at odds with 
 
 18  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012). 
 19  12 C.F.R. § 226.15(a)(ii)(2)–(3) (2013). 
 20  See infra Part III. 
 21  This can be seen in recent decisions from the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits.  See infra Part III. 
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TILA’s self-proclaimed pro-consumer purpose.22  The textualists, on 
the other hand, who strive to apply Congress’s words without heed to 
what Congress might have meant to say, read the regulation as 
requiring only notice.23 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has filed 
multiple amicus briefs urging a strict textualist interpretation of this 
statute and regulation, such as the approach adopted by the 
conservative Fourth Circuit.24  Created in 201025 and operational as of 
2011,26 the CFPB was not even a gleam in the eye of the executive 
branch when the Board promulgated Regulation Z back in 1969.27  
Now, however, the CFPB has taken over the reins of TILA; indeed, 
“the newly formed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau  . . . 
assume[d] primary regulatory authority over the mortgage industry 
and exclusive rulemaking authority under TILA.28 Consequently, the 
CFPB’s interpretation of TILA regulations warrants judicial 
deference, and its strong policy arguments support the notice-as-
 
 22  See supra text accompanying notes 7–13. 
 23  See infra Part III.  It is tempting to look for a reflection of politics in this split, 
but it has become increasingly difficult to associate interpretive methodologies with 
political leanings.  See infra notes 24, 29.  For an excellent discussion of the 
correlation between political affiliation and panel voting, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID 
SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?  AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 17–40 (2006).  
 24  See Robert Bostrom, CFPB Files Amicus Brief in TILA Case, Says More to Come 
(Apr. 16, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://mondaq-business.vlex.com/vid 
/cfpb-files-amicus-in-tila-case-more-365470614.  Could this be another sign that the 
Fourth Circuit has begun to shift to the left?  For a concise discussion of the Fourth 
Circuit’s conservative past and recent ideological movement, see David Stout, 4th 
Circuit Turns Left, Leaving ‘Most Conservative’ Label Behind (Nov. 23, 2011, 11:47 AM), 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/11/23/ 
4th-circuit-turns-left-leaving-most-conservative-label-behind/.  
 25  See THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (“The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank 
Act) established the consumer bureau.  In January of 2012, President Obama 
appointed Rich Cordray to be the first Director of the CFPB.”). 
 26  See Wally Adeyemo, September 2010: Transfer Date Announced, CFPB BLOG (Sept. 
9, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/2011/02/ (“Less than 
two months after President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act into law, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced that 
the one-year anniversary of the law—July 21, 2011—will serve as the ‘designated 
transfer date’ . . . . when consumer financial protection functions of seven federal 
agencies will transfer to the CFPB.”). 
 27  See Gambardella v. G. Fox & Co., 716 F.2d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The FRB 
promulgated Regulation Z in 1969.”). 
 28  Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 773 
F. Supp. 2d 151, 167 (D.D.C. 2011).  
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sufficient reading of TILA’s rescission provision. 
Although it is somewhat surprising that the CFPB, the product of 
a liberal administration, advocates a textualist construction of section 
1635(f),29 it comes as no surprise that TILA rescission has become a 
textualist-intentionalist battleground: TILA has hosted such wars in 
the past.  In Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Incorporated v. Nigh, a divided 
Court explored both the meaning and the proper manner of 
interpreting TILA’s Damages-Ceiling Provision.30  In Beach v. Ocwen 
Federal Bank, a unanimous Court held that TILA’s rescission provision 
fully extinguishes the right to rescind unlike a statute of limitations, 
which would extinguish only the right to file a cause of action.31  
Though the Court employed a textual analysis in reaching this 
decision, its conclusion stressed the importance of legislative intent.32 
Courts involved in the current circuit split have been deciding 
not only whether notice suffices to trigger TILA rescission, but also 
the relevance of the Court’s decision in Beach.33  Because Beach is not 
exactly on point, it would govern only to the extent that the 
interpretive mechanism it employs should be extended to other TILA 
provisions.  The question thus becomes whether methodological 
precedent can be set, and, if so, what exactly such precedent would 
impose upon lower courts.  The applicability of Beach is polarizing, 
with the intentionalists declaring Beach to control and the textualists 
rejecting Beach as unrelated.34 
This comment will argue that, in determining how TILA 
rescission is accomplished, the Court should also find that Beach does 
not control and should instead defer to the CFPB’s interpretation.  
Although the circuits present these issues in textualist and 
intentionalist terms, the Court need not—and should not—name 
either interpretive methodology victorious.  Both schools are 
fundamentally positivistic.  By allowing them to coexist, the Court has 
created an epistemological friction that transcends the rigidity either 
 
 29  The CFPB’s textualism, see infra Part III.B, corresponds with the rise of “New 
Textualism.”  For a discussion of the important trend among liberals to perform 
textualist analysis, see, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Rosen on the “New Textualism”, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(June 13, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com 
/prawfsblawg/2012/06/rosen-on-the-new-textualism.html. 
 30  543 U.S. 50 (2004); see infra Part II.A. 
 31  523 U.S. 410 (1998); see infra Part II.B. 
 32  See id. at 418–19; see also infra Part II.B (discussing Beach at length). 
 33  See infra Part II. 
 34  See infra Parts III.A and III.B (discussing the intentionalist and textualist 
approaches, respectively). 
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method would impose on its own. 
Part II of this comment explores the textualist-intentionalist 
clash in the Court’s Koons Buick decision.  The many opinions written 
in this case offer a glimpse of what a decision regarding the rescission 
mechanism might, and should, look like.  Part II next explores Beach  
and its limits.  Beach incarnates the other great interpretive clash in 
TILA’s history. 
Part III moves to the current circuit split, which continues to 
expand as new decisions are handed down.  Subpart A focuses on the 
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ intentionalist views of rescission.  
Subpart B explores the Third and Fourth Circuits’ textualist readings 
of Regulation Z. 
Part IV.A argues that the Court should declare Beach inapposite; 
Part IV.B, that the Court should defer to the CFPB’s interpretation of 
Regulation Z.  Part V, the conclusion, revisits the background and 
stakes of the current circuit split.  Despite the textualist-intentionalist 
lines along which the circuits examine TILA rescission, the Court 
should resolve the issue without favoring either interpretive school. 
II. PAST TILA BATTLES 
A. A Subparagraph by Any Other Name: The Damages-Ceiling Dispute 
Until 1995, the provision that set guidelines for TILA damages 
awards proclaimed that non-compliant lenders would be liable to 
borrowers 
in an amount equal to the sum of— . . . (2)(A)(i) in the 
case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance 
charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the 
case of an individual action relating to a consumer lease 
under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total 
monthly payments under the lease, except that the liability 
under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor 
greater than $1000 . . . .35 
Courts widely held that the $100–$1000 limit applied both to subpart 
(i) and to subpart (ii), which were viewed as parts of the same 
“subparagraph.”36  Thus, the range of $100–$1000 was applied to all 
 
 35  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1980).   
 36  See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 55–56 (2004) 
(“Following the insertion of the consumer lease provision, courts consistently held 
that the $100/$1,000 limitation remained applicable to all consumer financing 
transactions, whether lease or loan.”) (citing Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 
F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996); Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941 
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damage awards set forth in § 1640(a)(2). 
The statute remained unaltered from 1976 to 1995, when 
obfuscation struck: in its Act of September 30, 1995, Congress 
amended subsection (a)(2) by “substitut[ing] ‘(ii)’ for ‘or (ii)’ and 
insert[ing]” a third subpart.37  As a result, 15 USC § 
1640(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) now imposes liability 
in an amount equal to the sum of— . . . (2)(A)(i) in the 
case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance 
charge in connection with the transaction, (ii) in the case of 
an individual action relating to a consumer lease under part 
E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total monthly 
payments under the lease, except that the liability under 
this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater 
than $1000, or (iii) in the case of an individual action 
relating to a credit transaction not under an open end 
credit plan that is secured by real property or a dwelling, 
not less than $200 or greater than $2000 . . . .38 
Does “under this subparagraph” still to apply to both parts (i) and 
(ii) when it manifestly cannot apply to (iii)?  Or did the 1995 
iteration of the statute effectively detach the first part from the 
second, such that the ceiling now applies only to part (ii)?  Did 
Congress, without changing the signifier employed, alter that which it 
signified? 
The Seventh Circuit was the first to take aim at the moving target 
created by Congress’s 1995 amendment.  After affirming that the 
statute was clear and unambiguous until the 1995 addition,39 the 
Strange court announced that the addendum “was designed simply to 
establish a more generous minimum and maximum for certain 
secured transactions [i.e. those secured by real estate], without 
changing the rule on minimum and maximum damage awards for 
the other two parts of § 1640(a)(2)(A).”40 
With its connotations of draftsmanship41 seasoned with hints of 
 
(7th Cir. 1995); Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th 
Cir. 1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 661 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (8th Cir. 
1981) (per curiam); Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 358, 359 n.17 (5th Cir. 
1979)).   
 37  15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2012).   
 38  Id.   
 39  Strange v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., 129 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 40  Id. (emphasis added).  
 41  See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 459 (2d ed. 2005) (defining 
“design” as to “decide upon the look and functioning of (a building, garment, or 
other object), typically by making a detailed drawing of it”). 
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intent,42 “designed” is a succinct masterstroke of evasion.  Indeed, the 
court matched the statutory ambiguity of which it complains with an 
exegetical ambiguity no less notable.  The structural aspect of 
“designed”—design as draftsmanship—evokes textualism; the plan-
driven, plotting aspect of the same word implicates intentionalism.  
Without offering any further insight into its reasoning, the Strange 
court simply concluded that “the ‘subparagraph’ mentioned in § 
1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) continues to encompass what is now codified as 
subparts (A)(i) and (A)(ii), not just subpart (A)(ii).”43 
The Fourth Circuit took a more direct and explicit approach in 
Nigh.44  Judge Gregory’s dissent lauds “the Seventh Circuit’s well-
reasoned analysis,”45 and even the Nigh majority remarked that “[i]t 
could well be . . . that Congress did not intend to alter the statutory 
cap applicable under subparagraph (A)(i) when it amended the 
statute in 1995.”46  The majority, however, emphatically refused to 
meander down what-if street, asserting that “the critical point of 
law—and it is critical—is that we do not know what Congress 
intended; all that we have before us is the amended statute from 
which to determine intent.”47  Noting staunchly that “[i]t is the 
statute, not any inferential intent, that constitutes the law,” the 
majority held that “Congress did alter the statutory cap regardless of 
its intent” and observed that Congress was free to amend the statute if 
it “enacted into law something different from what it intended.”48  
The majority anchored its textualist approach to the separation of 
powers, affirming that “[i]n this way, and in this way only, are the 
constitutional roles of the legislature and the courts respected.”49 
The Fourth Circuit majority found that, “by striking the ‘or’ 
preceding (ii), and inserting (iii) after the ‘under this subparagraph’ 
phrase,” Congress “rendered [the application of the limit set forth in 
(ii) to the entirety of § 1640(a)(2)(A)] defunct.”50  Thus, “Congress’s 
amendment requires that the reference point of the ‘under this 
subparagraph’ clause be the subparagraph of § 1640 (a)(2)(A)(ii), 
 
 42  See Id. (offering as a second definition: “do or plan (something) with a specific 
purpose or intention in mind”). 
 43  Strange, 129 F.3d at 947. 
 44  Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 319 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 45  Id. at 132 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
 46  Id. at 128 (majority opinion). 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 319 F.3d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 2003).   
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and not the subparagraph of § 1640 (a)(2)(A)(i).”51  The Nigh 
majority read the word “subparagraph” as having a reduced scope of 
reference rather than a new meaning.52 
A divided Supreme Court weighed in to resolve the split that the 
Fourth Circuit created with respect to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
in its Koons Buick decision.53  The several concurrences and lone 
dissenting opinion question this approach.54  The Court’s fractured 
response gives some insight into how the current rescission-provision 
split may fare when it goes up.  Koons Buick provides a full spectrum 
of approaches ranging from extreme intentionalism to radical 
textualism.55  In between, the Justices offer possible models of 
coexistence for the two interpretive methodologies.56 
The Court ultimately held that the Seventh Circuit had the right 
of it and, in so doing, adopted a moderately intentionalist approach.  
Justice Ginsburg notes in her plurality opinion that Congress’s 
“[l]ess-than-meticulous drafting of the 1995 amendment [(to 15 
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A))] created an ambiguity,” but that the 
ambiguity was solely textual in nature.57  “The purpose of the 1995 
amendment,” the Justice stresses, “is not in doubt: Congress meant to 
raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end loans 
secured by real property.”58  Guided by this purpose and finding 
“scant indication that Congress simultaneously sought to remove the 
$1,000 cap on loans secured by personal property,”59 the Court 
declined to interpret the textual ambiguity as requiring removal,60 
determining instead that “‘common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark,’ that an amendment 
having the effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently 
 
 51  Id. at 127.   
 52  One may wonder at this point whether “subparagraph” should ever have been 
understood to encompass § (A)(i) as well as (A)(ii).  An abundance of circuit 
decisions applied the ceiling to both provisions.  See supra note 36.  The lack of 
legislative backlash in response to these decisions might suggest legislative 
ratification of this interpretation. 
 53  Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004).   
 54  Id. at 65–76.  
 55  Id. at 60–76. 
 56  Id. at 60–63. 
 57  Id. at 53.   
 58  Id.   
 59  Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 53 (2004). 
 60  See id. at 63–64 (“[T]he text does not dictate [removing the limit]; the 
statutory history suggests otherwise; and there is scant indication Congress meant to 
change the well-established meaning of clause (i).”).   
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described by its sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the 
floor manager of the bill.’”61 
Although the plurality attributes great significance to 
congressional intent, or the absence thereof, it frames its 
intentionalist inquiry as a “step two” that can only follow a 
preliminary finding of textual ambiguity.62  Thus, though Justice 
Ginsburg applies a strong form of intentionalism—the determination 
of what was meant as a function of what was not said—the Justice 
simultaneously subordinates intentionalist analysis to an initial 
textual inquiry.63  Justice Ginsburg’s textualist-intentionalist 
compromise garnered the signatures of a plurality of the Justices, and 
may indicate how the current circuit split will be resolved.64  The 
many other opinions proffered in Koons Buick, of course, offer 
possible alternatives. 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred to assert a 
stronger form of intentionalism.65  Rather than “only look at 
legislative history for the purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or 
to avoid absurdities,” Justice Stevens admonishes, “[i]t would be wiser 
 
 61  Id. at 61 (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. I.R.S., 484 U.S. 9, 17–18 
(1987)).   
 62  Justice Ginsburg makes the secondary nature of the Court’s inquiry into 
congressional intent clear, observing that “[t]he statutory history resolves any 
ambiguity whether the $100/$1,000 brackets apply to recoveries under clause (i).”  
Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 62.  Justice Ginsburg’s textualist inquiry is notable in another 
respect as well: it marks the first time a Justice invoked the legislative drafting 
manuals used by Congress as interpretive authority.  For an excellent discussion of 
this jurisprudential landmark, see B. J. Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: 
Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 186–89 
(2010). 
 63  In finding significance in Justice Ginsburg’s granting of primacy to the 
textualist inquiry, I disagree with Jonathan T. Molot, who finds that when “two 
interpreters use the same interpretive tools to reach the same interpretive result, [it 
does not] really matter that one (the textualist) purports to use context to decide on 
a textual meaning while the other (the purposivist) admits that he is adjusting the 
text’s meaning to reconcile it with the context.”  Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall 
of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). 
 64  Not all Justices agree that the text is truly ambiguous.  Some suggest, rather, 
that the Court imputed ambiguity to the text in order to justify extratextual analysis.  
See infra pp. 15–16 for a discussion of Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion and 
Justice Scalia’s dissent.   
 65  Justice Stevens has been described as “the Court’s leading intentionalist.”  
Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 275, 325 (1998) (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the 
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 357 (1994)); William D. Popkin, An 
“Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
1133, 1135 (1992). 
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to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available 
evidence of Congress’[s] true intent when interpreting its work 
product,”66 because “[c]ommon sense is often more reliable than rote 
repetition of canons of statutory construction.”67  Decrying “wooden 
reliance on those canons,”68 the Justice asserts that “an unambiguous 
text describing a plausible policy decision” is not “a sufficient basis for 
determining the meaning of a statute.”69  Noting that the Court 
“cannot escape [the] unambiguous statutory command by 
proclaiming that it would produce an absurd result,” Justice Stevens 
notes that it “can, however, escape by using common sense.”70  To 
apply common sense to the present matter involves contemplating 
the provision’s history, which reveals that “a busy Congress is fully 
capable of enacting a scrivener’s error into law.”71  This willingness to 
find statutory error based on conclusions regarding congressional 
intent rather than agrammaticality or implausibility is intentionalism 
at its most extreme.72 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by the Chief Justice, 
advocates a more guarded form of intentionalism.  It approves the 
consultation of “extratextual sources”73 in the present matter because 
“the text is not altogether clear.  That means that examination of 
other interpretive resources, including predecessor statutes, is 
necessary for a full and complete understanding of the congressional 
intent.”74  Justice Kennedy describes intent as a tie-breaker for 
determining which of two equally plausible readings of the word 
“subparagraph” should govern.75  Textualism is the default rule in 
statutory interpretation; intentionalism, a failsafe to be applied on an 
as-needed basis, where need is determined not by notions of common 
 
 66  Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).   
 67  Id. at 65–66 (Stevens, J., concurring).   
 68  Id. at 66 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 69  Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).   
 70  Id.   
 71  Id.   
 72  One scholar describes Justice Stevens as “the leader of the intentionalist 
camp,” holding the pole opposite the one held by Justice Scalia in the “textualist-
intentionalist divide.”  See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41260, THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS: THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 9–11 (2012).   
 73  Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 74  Id. at 66–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 75  See id. at 67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that looking outward when 
faced with an ambiguous text is “fully consistent with cases in which, because the 
statutory provision had only one plausible textual reading, we did not rely on such 
sources”). 
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sense but by the words of the statute.  Whereas Justice Ginsburg’s 
intentionalism gets the final word and thus eclipses her textual 
analysis,76 Justice Kennedy establishes a strict text-intent hierarchy.77 
Justice Thomas concurred to voice agreement with the results—
though not with the analytical method—of the majority.  Justice 
Thomas advocates a textualist approach,78 noting that “[i]f the text in 
this case were clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted.”79 
Because, however, the statute “is not a model of the best practices in 
legislative drafting,”80 the Justice finds it necessary to look beyond the 
letter of the text.  Although Justice Thomas does look outward, the 
“anything else” that the Justice consults is limited to the fact that parts 
(i) and (ii) had been read in a particular way until 1995 and that the 
1995 amendment added a part (iii) without altering the extant 
parts.81  Absent any affirmative change, suggests Justice Thomas, no 
interpretive change should take place.82 
 
 76  In this shift, Justice Ginsburg’s Koons Buick  opinion is consonant with what 
one scholar has noted to be generally true of the Justice’s “labor and anti-
discrimination opinions—although they begin with textual analysis[, they] rely 
heavily on legislative history and purpose as well as on agency deference.”  James J. 
Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg’s Eclectic Approach to 
Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889, 892 (2009). 
 77  See R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court 
and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 39 (1997) 
(quoting Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)) (discussing supporters of Justice Scalia’s textualism and quoting Justice 
Kennedy’s comment that “it does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to 
rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in 
order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is 
more comfortable”).  
 78  In discussing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence, one scholar has written that, 
“[s]ince his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1991, Justice Thomas’[s] judicial 
fidelity to textualism has served, like a lighthouse on the shore, as a powerful beacon 
to the Rehnquist Court, constantly returning it safely to the original intent of the 
Framers.”  Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the 
Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 351, 351–52 (2002). 
 79  Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).   
 80  Id. at 68 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 81  See id. at 67 (Thomas, J., concurring).  This approach is consistent with Justice 
Thomas’s usual interpretive practices.  See Judge H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging 
Contours of Justice Thomas’s Textualism, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 365, 366 (1999-2000) 
(quotation marks omitted) (“Assisted by canons and dictionaries, Justice Thomas 
asks whether the statutory text admits of plain interpretation, and if so, then judicial 
inquiry is complete; or if there is irreducible ambiguity, and if so looks guardedly 
beyond.”). 
 82   Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 69 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The only substantive 
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Alone in his dissent, Justice Scalia adopts an extreme textualist 
approach,83 asserting that Congress did effect an affirmative change in 
the text when it amended the statute: by adding a part (iii) to which 
part (ii) could not possibly apply, Justice Scalia argues, Congress 
rendered it textually impossible for part (ii) to continue to be 
interpreted to govern part (i).84  Observing that “[t]he ultimate 
question here is not the meaning of ‘subparagraph,’ but the scope of 
the exception which contains that term,” Justice Scalia determines 
that a corollary of adding part (iii) to § 1640 (a)(2)(A) was to free 
part (i) of the $100–$1000 window that had been applied to it.85  
Where the majority finds an accident—an unfortunate side effect that 
resulted, intention-free, from the one deliberate change Congress 
made—Justice Scalia finds potential legislative economy, a 
transformation made by absence of change.86  Justice Scalia faults the 
majority for employing the “Canon of Canine Silence” to treat a 
change wrought by inaction as a non-change and argues that the 
statute should be construed as it now reads, rather than as it once 
read.87  The results of uncapping part (i) would not be catastrophic 
because the high-amount loans likely to yield large damages are 
treated in parts (ii) and (iii), which do have fixed limits.88 
Justice Scalia argues, further, that the Court should respect its 
limits: “‘It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting 
errors, and to provide for what we might think is the preferred 
result.’”89  While Justice Kennedy describes such absolute adherence 
 
change that amendment wrought was the creation of clause (iii) . . . . By so 
structuring the amendment, Congress evinced its intent to address only the creation 
of a different limit for a specific set of transactions.”). 
 83  One scholar suggests “deferential textualism” as best suited to describe Justice 
Scalia’s brand of textualist inquiry in order to distinguish the Justice’s distinct goal of 
deferring to the legislature from traditional “strict textualism.”  See Aprill, supra note 
65, at 279–80.  For the purposes of highlighting the spectrum of approaches 
advocated in Koons Buick, this Comment uses “extreme” to mark Justice Scalia’s 
dissent as the antipode of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. 
 84  Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 72 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 85  Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 86  Id. at 72, 76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the removal of the word “or” 
forces a change in the meaning of the statute that reflects a “‘plausible policy 
decision’” and stressing that “[t]he Court should not fight the current structure of 
the statute merely to vindicate the suspicion that Congress actually made—but 
neglected to explain clearly—a different policy decision” (quoting id. at 65 (Stevens, 
J., concurring)). 
 87  Id. at 73 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88  See id. at 75–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 89  Id. at 76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 
542 (2004)).   
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to the letter of the law “wooden,” Justice Scalia argues it to be a 
means of avoiding the “ventriloquism” to which the Court falls prey 
when “[t]he Congressional Record or committee reports are used to 
make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which were 
spoken or written by others.”90 
Both pure textualism and pure intentionalism yield an 
unhealthy automatism.91  The majority’s compromise gives hope that 
the Court’s determination of the current notice-of-rescission debate 
will be equally circumspect with respect to interpretive methodology. 
B. TILA’s Rescission Provision: A Statute of Limitation or Repose? 
The Court’s ruling on another provision may make such 
circumspection difficult.  Whereas the damages-ceiling debate92 may 
anticipate the drama to unfold when the Court decides the 
mechanics of TILA rescission, some circuits argue that the Court’s 
decision in Beach,93 which addresses TILA’s rescission provision itself, 
bears directly upon the current circuit split.94 
In Beach the Court reviewed a Florida Supreme Court decision 
that conflicted with decisions other courts had reached in 
interpreting the three-year limit set by § 1635(f).95  The Florida 
 
 90  Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 91  The potential for automatism inherent in the monist inquiry of both the 
textualist and intentionalist schools is concisely encapsulated in Michel Rosenfeld’s 
discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s legal philosophy: 
[S]ince Dworkin is neither a strict textualist (i.e., he does not believe 
that the meaning of a legal text derives exclusively from the “plain 
meaning” of the words and phrases contained in it) nor an 
intentionalist (i.e., he does not believe that the meaning of a text can 
be established by ascertaining its author’s intention), it follows that he 
must be able to rely on a hermeneutic approach subject to 
intersubjective verification or approval. 
MICHEL ROSENFELD, LAW, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND THE CLASH OF CULTURES: A 
PLURALIST ACCOUNT 188 (2011).  For a discussion of how such pluralism may be 
achieved through collaboration and compromise among Justices, see CHRISTOPHER E. 
SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT 55–
61(1993).  For a fascinating parallel between jurisprudential method and musical 
interpretation, see Groh’s Liszt: How “Originalist” is Originalism, Anyway?, CHAMBER 
MUSIC TODAY (Oct. 20, 2007, 1:55 PM), 
http://chambermusictoday.blogspot.com/2007/10/grohs-liszt 
-how-originalist-is.html (describing textualism and intentionalism as subsets of 
conservative originalism in both music and the law, and juxtaposing both 
interpretive schools with the pragmatist theory of the living score/Constitution).   
 92  See supra Part II.A. 
 93  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411–19 (1998). 
 94  See infra Part III. 
 95  See supra Part I.B. for text of statute. 
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Supreme Court held that a borrower could not rescind by affirmative 
defense in a suit filed after the three years had elapsed.96  The 
Supreme Court of the United States considered—but rejected—the 
possibility that § 1635 is a classic “statute of limitation governing only 
the institution of suit and accordingly has no effect when a borrower 
claims a § 1635 right of rescission as a ‘defense in recoupment’ to a 
collection action.”97 
The Court agreed that “as a general matter a defendant’s right 
to plead ‘recoupment’ . . .  survives the expiration of the period 
provided by a statute of limitation . . . .”98  “So long as the plaintiff’s 
action is timely,” the Court noted, “a defendant may raise a claim in 
recoupment even if he could no longer bring it independently, 
absent ‘the clearest congressional language’ to the contrary.”99  
Nevertheless, the Court found that “[t]he issue here is not whether 
limitation statutes affect recoupment rights, but whether § 1635(f) is 
a statute of limitation.”100 
The Court thus examined “‘whether [the three-year limit] 
operates, with the lapse of time, to extinguish the right which is the 
foundation for the claim,’ or ‘merely to bar the remedy for its 
enforcement.’”101  The latter interpretation would be consistent with a 
statute of limitations and would permit borrowers to assert rescission 
as an affirmative defense; the former interpretation, in keeping with a 
statute of repose, would eliminate the possibility of rescinding, for 
any reason, beyond the three-year window. 102  The Court held that 
TILA’s rescission provision extinguishes the borrower’s right to 
rescind and makes no allowance for reviving the right once expired.103 
The Beach Court’s method of analysis is striking: the Court 
 
 96  Beach, 523 U.S. at 414. 
 97  Id. at 415.   
 98  Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
 99  Id. (quotation and citations omitted).  
 100  Id. at 416. 
 101  Id. (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pa. R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 358–359 
(1943)). 
 102  The Court’s determination that § 1635(f) is not a statute of limitations has 
been equated by some circuits with a finding that TILA is a statute of repose.  See 
infra Parts III.A. and IV.A. (discussing the circuit decisions).  The distinction between 
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation is a subtle but important one.  See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4, at 
20–21 (1987) (“Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations . . . the period contained in 
a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause 
of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.”)). 
 103  See Beach, 523 U.S. at 414–15.  
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employs both textualism and intentionalism in a unanimous opinion.  
The Court begins by noting that, unlike “a typical statute of 
limitation[, which provides] that a cause of action may or must be 
brought within a certain period of time,”104 § 1635(f) “says nothing in 
terms of bringing an action.”105  “[I]nstead,” the Court observes, “[§ 
1635(f)] provides that the ‘right of rescission [under the Act] shall 
expire’ at the end of the time period.”106  The Court stresses that the 
rescission provision establishes how long the right to rescind lasts 
rather than the deadline for filing suit, and in eminently direct 
terms.107  Indeed, the Court finds the provision so clear that “[t]here 
is no reason . . . to resort to the canons of construction that we use to 
resolve doubtful cases.”108 
At this point, the Court’s logic begins to shift.  Until now, the 
decision clung to the statute’s actual words.  After finding § 1635’s 
words clear, however, the Court looks elsewhere in TILA and finds 
that Congress did insert words to mark other TILA provisions as 
statutes of limitation.109  Thus, the Court reasons, Congress chose not 
to include similar limitations language in § 1635(f).110  Applying what 
Justice Scalia has branded the “Canon of Canine Silence,”111 the Beach 
Court remarks: “Where Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely 
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”112 
The Court then moves further from the text of § 1635, 
suggesting that, “[s]ince a statutory right of rescission could cloud a 
bank’s title on foreclosure, Congress may well have chosen to 
circumscribe that risk, while permitting recoupment damages 
 
 104  Id. at 416. 
 105  Id. at 417. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  See Beach, 523 U.S. at 416 (noting that “[t]he terms of a typical statute of 
limitation provide that a cause of action may or must be brought within a certain 
period of time,” and providing examples of such language). 
 110  See id. at 417–18.   
 111  See supra Part II.A.  Interpreting absence, though common to moderate 
textualist inquiries, marks a deviation from the pure textualism with which the Court 
begins.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xi–xvii (2012) (listing the fifty-seven canons of 
interpretation, which do not include the analysis of unused words). 
 112  Beach, 523 U.S. at 418 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
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regardless of the date a collection action may be brought.”113  The 
Court thus posits a guess—suitably adorned in the conditional 
mood—as to what congressional aim might underlie § 1635(f)’s 
structure and function. 
In closing, the Court declares that it has chosen to “respect 
Congress’s manifest intent by concluding that the Act permits no 
federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year 
period of § 1635(f) has run.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Florida.”114  This emphatic conclusion is 
slippery, because congressional intent is linked in the opinion both to 
the absence of limitations language and to the choice to circumscribe 
the risk of clouding title.115  The first of these reflects analytical 
inquiry; the second, clearly speculative dicta.116 
As we turn to the rescission-mechanism split, we will see courts 
clash over the weight due the Beach dicta.  In theory, Beach is off-topic: 
whether § 1635(f) extinguishes a right or a cause of action is not 
germane to whether notice must be sent or a suit must be filed.  The 
Beach conclusion, however, is broad enough to suggest that timely 
notice coupled with late filing would subvert Congress’s “manifest 
intent” to render the three-year period a sacrosanct outer limit.  Is 
the Court’s hypothesis regarding congressional intent binding 
precedent upon lower courts? 
III. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT: HOW DOES ONE RESCIND UNDER 
TILA? 
When the Court interprets the rescission provision,117 it will 
 
 113  Id. at 418–19 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 114  Id. at 418 (emphasis added). 
 115  The Court’s Beach conclusion thus risks participating in a phenomenon that 
Judge Pierre N. Laval laments, namely the fact that “more and more, dicta flex 
muscle to which . . . they are not entitled by constitutional right.”  Pierre N. Laval, 
James Madison Lecture, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1250 (2006).  Laval explains the danger posed by overstated dicta: 
We judges regularly undertake to promulgate law through utterance of 
dictum made to look like a holding-in disguise, so to speak.  When we 
do so, we seek to exercise a lawmaking power that we do not rightfully 
possess.  Also, we accept dictum uttered in a previous opinion as if it 
were binding law, which governs our subsequent adjudication.  When 
we do so, we fail to discharge our responsibility to deliberate on and 
decide the question which needs to be decided. 
Id. 
 116  See id. at 1258–59 (noting that though it can be difficult to distinguish dicta 
from holdings, this distinction is vial in a system of stare decisis). 
 117  See supra Part I.B. for the text of the relevant statutory provision, 15 U.S.C. § 
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necessarily either apply or decline to apply Beach.  If the Court finds 
Beach inapplicable, we may expect a fiery array of interpretations 
similar to those we analyzed in Koons Buick.118  If the Court holds that 
Beach applies, however, the conclusion that it is Congress’s “manifest 
intent” to terminate the right to rescind after three years would force 
a finding that a complaint is necessary to trigger rescission.  To 
anticipate which way the Court may hold—and to assess whether the 
answer is bound to a choice between textualism and intentionalism—
we turn to the relevant circuit decisions. 
A. Intentionalist Decisions 
In McOmie the Ninth Circuit declares itself bound to treat § 
1635(f) as a statute of repose.119  “Were we writing on a blank slate,” 
the court proclaims, “we might consider whether notification within 
three years of the transaction could extend the time limit imposed by 
§ 1635(f).”120  The circuit promptly adds a big “but,” stating that, 
“under the case law of this court121 and the Supreme Court,122 
rescission suits must be brought within three years from the 
consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of rescission is 
delivered within that three-year period.”123  Wistfully, the McOmie 
court bows before what it deems to be precedent and blames stare 
decisis for its holding that a formal filing is necessary to trigger TILA 
rescission. 
The Ninth Circuit’s reading of the Beach holding, however, is 
overly expansive: Beach did not state the rule that the McOmie court 
attributes to it.  The circuit court extrapolates the Beach “rule” from 
the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he plain meaning of the Act . . . 
‘permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 
3-year period of 1635(f) has run.’”124  The Ninth Circuit’s focus on “or 
otherwise”—which it over-reads—causes it to lose sight of the 
question before it, namely whether notice constitutes an exercise of 
 
1635(f). 
 118  See supra Part II.A.  
 119  McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 
2012).  
 120  Id.   
 121  The case law to which the court refers was set forth in Miguel v. Country 
Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002).  See infra note 125. 
 122  This is a reference to the Beach decision, discussed supra Part II.B. 
 123  McOmie, 667 F.3d at 1328. 
 124  Id. (alteration in the original) (quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 532 U.S. 
410, 419 (1998)).  
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the right to rescind.  By treating Beach as precedent, the Ninth Circuit 
adopts the Court’s divination of congressional intent as binding.  
Because the Court’s position is not exactly on point, however, taking 
its divination as an unassailable starting point is a second degree of 
abstraction.  This second level of removal, in turn, leads the Ninth 
Circuit to use intent to change the meaning of clear language, not 
just to construe unclear language.125 
In Rosenfield,126 the Tenth Circuit agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that consumers must file a complaint in order to trigger 
TILA’s rescission provision127 and that Beach controls.128  The Rosenfield 
court begins by noting that “an examination of the structure of the 
right conferred in this case—that is, rescission—supports [its] 
conclusion.”129  The court stresses that the equitable remedy of 
rescission “is not . . . appropriate . . . in circumstances where its 
application would lead to prohibitively difficult (or impossible) 
enforcement.”130  The muddying of title that would flow from 
accepting notice as sufficient to trigger rescission rises to the level of 
prohibitive difficulty.131  Accordingly, the Rosenfield court states, “we 
ascertain no basis for concluding that the TILA rescission remedy 
differs in any material respect from the general form of rescission 
available in . . . analogous contexts.”132  The Rosenfield court 
acknowledges the CFPB’s contrary position but dismisses the CFPB’s 
evidence as “mostly concerning matters of state law.”133  The Tenth 
Circuit affirms that, as a statute of repose, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) 
“operates to completely extinguish the right being claimed after it 
lapses.”134  The Rosenfield court, in other words, treats Beach as 
 
 125  The circuit performs a similarly flag-raising abstraction with respect to its 
earlier decision in Miguel.  In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the borrowers 
had failed to exercise their right to rescind in a timely manner when they notified 
and filed suit against the wrong party during the three-year period and attempted to 
initiate action against the proper party only after the three years had passed.  See id. 
at 1329 (discussing Miguel, 309 F.3d at 1162–63). 
 126  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 127  See id. at 1187. 
 128  See id. at 1188.  
 129  Id. at 1183.   
 130  Id. at 1184. 
 131  See id. at 1185 (chronicling a number of difficulties and burdens that would 
flow from allowing rescission-by-notice). 
 132  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d at 1184 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 133  Id. at 1186 n.10.  See infra Parts III.B and IV.B for a discussion of the CFPB’s 
amicus brief. 
 134  Id. at 1182 (alteration in the original). 
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controlling.135 
In Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc.,136 the Eighth Circuit majority137 
explicitly adopts the Tenth Circuit’s analysis: “[W]e agree with the 
Tenth Circuit’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion in Rosenfield and 
hold that a plaintiff seeking rescission must file suit, as opposed to 
merely giving the bank notice, within three years in order to preserve 
that right pursuant to § 1635(f).”138  Like the Tenth Circuit, two 
judges of the Eighth Circuit find Beach dispositive: “Extrapolating 
from Beach, we hold that to accomplish rescission within the meaning 
of § 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court.”139 
The Kieran majority stresses that it has not abandoned the text: 
We are not unmindful of the language of Regulation Z or 
the interpretation of that regulation—that notice, as 
opposed to filing suit, is enough to preserve the right—that 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), amicus 
in this case, has advanced in favor of the plaintiffs.  
However, we agree with Rosenfield that the text of the 
statute, as explicated in Beach, establishes that filing suit is 
required.140 
 
 135   In an unpublished opinion carrying no precedential weight, the Third Circuit 
similarly held Beach to control and, consequently, also held that rescission requires 
the plaintiff to file a complaint within the three-year window.  The Williams court 
framed its holding in an interesting way, observing that: 
[i]t may be that an obligor may invoke the right to rescission by mere 
notice. Mere invocation without more, however, will not preserve the 
right beyond the three-year period.  Rather, consistent with § 1635(f), a 
legal action to enforce the right must be filed within the three-year 
period or the right will be “completely extinguishe[d].”  
Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 410 F. App’x 495, 499 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998)).  The Third Circuit’s 
opinion creates a distinction between “invocation of the right to rescind” with non-
extinguishment of that right, presumably by exercising it.  See id.  It is not clear what 
it might mean to “invoke” a right when such invocation is not tantamount to 
exercising a right.  See id. 
  In its precedential decision of February 5, 2013, however, the Third Circuit 
arrived at the opposite conclusion concerning both the applicability of Beach and the 
requirements for rescission.  See generally Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 
255 (3d Cir. 2013); infra Part III.B. 
 136  Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013).  Both the Keiran 
majority and the Keiran dissent find echo in the Eighth Circuit’s subsequent decision 
in Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752 (2013). 
 137  For a discussion of the dissenting Judge’s textualist interpretation of § 1635, 
see infra Part III.B. 
 138  Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728. 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. 
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By treating Beach as not only having resolved the issue presented 
therein, but also having established a guide to the textual 
interpretation of TILA, however, the Eighth Circuit subordinates the 
statute’s actual text to Beach’s explication of that text and, in so 
doing, adopts the intentionalist interpretation that the Supreme 
Court decision expounds in relation to another issue.141 
B. Textualist Decisions 
In Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC,142 the Fourth Circuit arrives 
at the opposite result.  The Gilbert court first considers “the plain 
meaning of the statute,” because “‘courts must presume that a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what 
it says there.  When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, 
this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.’”143  The 
Fourth Circuit finds the grail of “plain meaning” within the actual 
words of § 1635(f) and therefore declines to supplant or even gloss 
those words: “Simply stated, neither 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) nor 
Regulation Z says anything about the filing of a lawsuit, and we refuse 
to graft such a requirement upon them.”144 
After confining itself to reading the lines—rather than between 
the lines—of § 1635(f), the Gilbert court warns that “[w]e must not 
conflate the issue of whether a borrower has exercised her right to 
rescind with the issue of whether the rescission has, in fact, been 
completed and the contract voided.”145  The Fourth Circuit thus draws 
a practical distinction between exercising a right to rescind and 
actual rescission.146  “The former,” the Gilbert court insists, “is the 
concern of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z, and a borrower exercises her 
right of rescission by merely communicating in writing to her creditor 
her intention to rescind,”147 even though the borrower must then take 
additional steps “[t]o complete the rescission and void the 
contract.”148  Like its sister circuits, the Fourth Circuit requires either 
 
 141  See id.  The Eighth Circuit reiterated its reliance on Rosenfield and, by 
extension, on Beach in Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 142  Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 143  Id. at 276 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1981) 
(citations and quotation omitted)). 
 144  Id. at 277. 
 145  Id. 
 146  The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning stands in contrast to the Third Circuit’s 
invoke-exercise dichotomy in its unpublished Williams opinion.  See supra note 135. 
 147  Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277. 
 148  Id. 
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that “the creditor . . . acknowledge that the right of rescission is 
available and the parties . . . unwind the transaction amongst 
themselves, or [that] the borrower . . . file a lawsuit so that the court 
may enforce the right to rescind.”149  The Gilbert court applies § 
1635(f)’s three-year limit to the right to rescind, which can be 
exercised by notice, rather than to rescission itself. 
The Fourth Circuit was able to strike out on its own largely 
because it shrugged off the interpretive shackles of Beach.  Gilbert 
holds that Beach carries no precedential weight vis-à-vis the rescission 
deadline.  “Appellees’ reliance on [Beach] is misplaced,” the Gilbert 
court holds, because “[t]he Beach Court did not address the proper 
method of exercising a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that 
right.”150  Just as the Fourth Circuit adheres to the letter of the statute, 
it also adheres to the letter of Beach, refusing to embroider meaning 
upon the Court’s words. 
The Third Circuit took a similar stance in February 2013, with its 
Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services decision, announcing that, “[i]n 
resolving the question at issue here, we rely on the statutory 
language, not on the debatable implications of dicta.”151  In 
determining what is required to trigger rescission under TILA, the 
Third Circuit stressed that “nowhere in Beach does the Court address 
how an obligor must exercise his right of rescission within that three-
year period,”152 which the circuit described as the key question raised 
by the appeal.153  Though the Sherzer court does note that “Beach is 
consistent with [its] view” that notice suffices to rescind, its more 
definitive assertions concerning the inapplicability of Beach dicta 
make it clear that “consistency” was not the court’s paramount 
analytical objective.154 
Nor does the Third Circuit rely on legislative history in its 
analysis.  The Sherzer court refers in passing to a 1980 addition to 
TILA155  but otherwise steers clear of the inquiry into congressional 
 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. at 278.   
 151  Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 152  Id. at 262 (emphasis in the original). 
 153  Id. at 257 (“The question presented by this appeal is simple: does an obligor 
exercise his right to rescind a loan subject to TILA by so notifying the creditor in 
writing, or must the obligor file suit before the three-year period expires?”). 
 154  Id. at 258.  A more felicitous choice of phrase, given the Sherzer court’s 
adamant rejection of Beach dicta quoted above, would have been to say that Beach is 
not inconsistent with the court’s view of TILA rescission. 
 155  Id. at 260. 
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intent that informs the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.  
Though the Third Circuit never explicitly rejects intentionalism, it 
cements its textualist stance by relegating the policy concerns raised 
by the lenders—concerns similar to those raised by the Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits in expounding congressional intent—to for-the-sake-
of-completion analysis, observing that, “[w]hile the Lenders and their 
amici raise several concerns worthy of our careful attention, we find 
them unpersuasive for the reasons that follow.”156  This statement 
establishes a clear line between the textual analysis that led to the 
court’s decision and the policy-rich analysis that simply bolsters it. 
Indeed, the Third Circuit frames its decision in purely textualist 
terms.  The Sherzer court “begin[s] with the statutory text,”157 and, 
after scrutinizing § 1635 as a whole,158 states that “the answer to the 
question presented by this appeal is not pellucid, although we do 
think it is controlled by the statutory language.”159  The circuit 
musters both affirmative evidence indicating that notice constitutes 
rescission and negative evidence that “nothing in the text of the 
statute supports the view that [filing a complaint is necessary]”160 to 
bolster its determination that “the text of § 1635 and its 
implementing regulation . . . supports the view that to timely rescind 
a loan agreement, an obligor need only send a valid notice of 
rescission.”161  Ultimately, the Third Circuit rejects the view that 
rescission is triggered only by filing a complaint because that view 
“would require us to infer that the statute contains additional, 
unwritten requirements with which obligors must comply—an 
inference that seems particularly inappropriate in light of the fact 
that TILA is a remedial statute that we must construe liberally.”162  
 
 156  Id. at 261. 
 157  Id. at 258. 
 158  See id. at 258–61. 
 159  Id. at 261.  Curiously, despite noting a lack of pellucidity, the Third Circuit did 
not discuss the possibility of deferring to the CFPB’s interpretation of Regulation Z.  
See infra Part IV.B. 
 160  Id. at 260. 
 161  Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 162  Id. at 261.  This focus on the statute’s remedial purpose may seem more 
purposivist than textualist.  Indeed, Scalia and Garner fault the remedial purpose 
canon for precisely such reasons: 
The other problem with the remedial-statute rule is that identifying 
what a “liberal construction” consists of in impossible—which means 
that it is an open invitation to engage in “purposive” rather than 
textual interpretation, and generally to engage in judicial 
improvisation.  Of course, “liberal construction” does have an 
identifiable meaning if it means (as we suspect it originally did mean) 
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The Third Circuit thus finds support for its strict, text-based analysis 
in the consumer-protective purpose of the statute. 
Judge Murphy similarly finds harmony of text and purpose in § 
1635 in her elegant Kieran dissent: “The plain language of TILA, its 
implementing regulations, and its supporting policy rationales all 
support reading § 1635 to mean what it says: that rescission is 
exercised when a consumer provides written notice to the lender.”163  
Murphy considers the entirety of the statute and observes that 
“[n]owhere in the TILA statute is there any requirement that a 
consumer must file a lawsuit in order to exercise a right of 
rescission.”164  Nor, Judge Murphy argues, can such an imperative be 
imputed from the off-topic Beach or the non-germane distinction 
between a statute of limitation and a statute of repose.165 
Judge Murphy bolsters this text-based determination by 
weighing the policy goals undergirding TILA.166  Murphy concedes 
that “borrowers may sometimes make rescission claims without any 
valid basis,” but notes that “lenders may also deny them without legal 
right or might take advantage of uninformed consumers.”167  Murphy 
 
nothing more than rejection of “strict construction” and insistence on 
fair meaning.  The canon is therefore today either incomprehensible 
or superfluous. 
Scalia & Garner, supra note 111, at 365–66.  Nevertheless, the rule that “a statute . . . 
considered remedial . . . should be given a liberal interpretation and should be 
construed to give the terms used the most extensive meaning to which they are 
readily susceptible,” id. at 364 n.1 (quoting 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE 
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60:2, at 268 (7th ed. 2007)), has 
been one of the classic canons of interpretation since its invocation by John Jay, the 
first Chief Justice, in 1793, id. at 364.  Like the other canons of interpretation, the 
remedial purpose canon concentrates on the proper way to draw meaning from the 
language of a statute, a text-centric inquiry.  See, e.g., Elliot M. Davis, Note, The Newer 
Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1002–
03 (2007) (including the canons of interpretation among the tools in the “textualist’s 
toolbox”). 
 163  Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 164  Id. at 731 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 165  Id. at 732 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 166  See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734–36 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (offering a detailed analysis of policy arguments made by the majority as well 
as the parties and their amici).  Although Judge Melloy makes a strong textualist 
argument as noted infra in the text accompanying note 172, it is important to recall 
that he first adopts Murphy’s reasoning: “Were we writing on a clean slate . . . I would 
hold for the reasons stated by Judge Murphy in her dissent in Keiran that sending 
notice within three years of consummating a loan is sufficient to ‘exercise’ the right 
to rescind.”  Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., 
concurring). 
 167  Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
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faults her judicial brethren’s choice as to which of these two potential 
wrongdoers should receive the benefit of the legislative doubt: “The 
majority expresses much concern about the former issue and very 
little about the latter, yet TILA’s status as ‘remedial legislation, to be 
construed broadly in favor of consumers,’ dictates which problem 
takes precedence.”168  Judge Murphy concludes by rejecting the 
extratextual filing requirement under which “TILA would become a 
broad shield for lenders in spite of Congress’ manifest goal of 
ensuring that consumers receive an effective rescission right against 
both original and assignee lenders.”169 
Shortly after it decided Keiran, it again confronted the question 
of what borrowers must do to rescind in Hartman v. Smith.170  Bound 
by Keiran, Judge Melloy concurred with the Hartman court’s holding 
that filing a complaint is required, but wrote separately to express his 
disagreement with this determination.171  Judge Melloy approves 
Judge Murphy’s Keiran dissent and pushes her argument even 
further, stressing that the absence of a textual mandate to read § 
1635 as requiring borrowers to file suit should suffice to preclude 
reading such a requirement into the statute: 
That Congress provided a statute of limitations governing 
suits for damages demonstrates that it knew how to impose 
such a limitation and would have done the same regarding 
suits for rescission if it so desired; instead, however, the 
provision governing rescission states only that “the obligor 
shall have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by 
notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the 
Bureau, of his intention to do so.”172 
Whereas Judge Murphy bolstered her reading of the statute with 
policy considerations, Judge Melloy remains anchored to the text of § 
1635.  Judge Melloy also adheres to the text of Miguel v. Country 
 
(citations omitted). 
 168  Id. at 735 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 2009).  See also supra note 
162 for a discussion of the remedial purpose canon that Judge Murphy here employs. 
 169  Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 170   734 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2013).  Hartman was decided on August 19, 2013, id., 
just five weeks after Keiran, 720 F.3d at 721.  The Hartman appellee lost on appeal 
and petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc; a unanimous 8th Circuit 
denied these petitions in a two-sentence order on September 26, 2013.  Hartman v. 
Smith, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, 1 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The petition for rehearing 
en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.”). 
 171  Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d at 762 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring). 
 172  Id. (Melloy, J., concurring) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (emphasis added)). 
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Funding Corp.,173 which the Ninth Circuit relied on in deciding 
McOmie and which Judge Melloy asserts is off-topic.174  Judge Melloy 
thus offers a more purely textualist rationale for finding that notice is 
sufficient to rescind; indeed, Judge Melloy faults the majority’s focus 
on the practical consequences that might flow from this decision 
because the statute’s language is plain.175 
The unrest with respect to TILA’s rescission requirements is 
growing in the Eighth Circuit: Since Keiran and Hartman, this circuit 
has published yet another opinion on § 1635’s requirements.  The 
very short per curiam opinion in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, 
Inc. holds, as do the prior cases, that filing a complaint is necessary to 
rescind.176  The two concurrences in this three-judge decision, one by 
Judge Melloy—citing his Hartman concurrence177—and one by Judge 
Colloton—citing Judge Murphy’s Keiran dissent as well as the Third 
Circuit’s opinion in Sherzer178—lament the fact that they are bound by 
Keiran. 
When the losing party petitioned for rehearing in Jesinowski, the 
Eighth Circuit denied the petitions in much more dramatic fashion 
than it did in Hartman179: 4 judges—Judge Murphy and three others—
dissented,180 and Judge Colloton concurred because, “[n]o matter 
how this court decides this case, there will remain a well-developed 
conflict in the circuits on the question of how a consumer may 
exercise his or her right to rescind under the Truth in Lending Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).”181  Judge Colloton then explains why the circuit 
split cautions against a rehearing: 
It appears that none of these cases was presented to the 
Supreme Court by way of petition for writ of certiorari, so it 
cannot be said that the Court has resolved to leave the issue 
 
 173  309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 174  Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring) 
(discussing McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 
2012)). 
 175  Id. (Melloy, J., concurring) (“I do not believe that requiring lenders to initiate 
declaratory-judgment actions—rather than defend in rescission actions—is so 
undesirable that it reaches a level of absurdity such that this Court should ignore the 
plain language of the statute and Regulation Z.”). 
 176  729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 177  Id. (Melloy, J. concurring). 
 178  Id. at 1094 (Colloton, J., concurring). 
 179  See supra note 170. 
 180  Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23027, 1 
(8th Cir. 2013). 
 181  Id. at *1–2 (Colloton, J., concurring) (collecting cases). 
HATTON (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:49 PM 
234 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:207 
 
to individual circuits despite a conflict in authority.  
Therefore, I conclude that the resources of a rehearing en 
banc are not warranted at this time simply to move this 
court from one side to the other in what may prove to be a 
short-lived conflict in the circuits.182 
Judge Colloton thus anticipates that the Supreme Court of the 
United States will weigh in to resolve the split that has divided the 
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits from the Third and Fourth 
Circuits, a division that the fractured decisions of the Eighth Circuit 
echo in microcosm. 
IV. HOW SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVE THE SPLIT? 
Like the Third Circuit and Judge Murphy, the Court should 
heed TILA’s stated purpose—to inform and protect consumers—
before honing in on the text of § 1635 itself when it resolves the 
present split.183  The Act’s umbrella introduction states that TILA 
aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit 
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to 
protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing.”184  
The Court should choose an interpretation that best reflects the goals 
set forth by TILA’s introductory provision.185 
Here, the textualist interpretation appears more in keeping with 
TILA objectives.  The Third and Fourth Circuits hold that borrowers 
may exercise their right to rescind by notifying the lender of their 
intent to do so within that three-year window.186  The Eighth, Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, require that borrowers sue 
their lenders within three years of entering into a loan agreement or 
forever lose the right to rescind.187  This intentionalist position 
demands a level of awareness on the part of borrowers that seems 
incongruous with TILA’s objectives.188  As Judge Murphy’s dissenting 
 
 182  Id. at *2 (Colloton, J., concurring). 
 183  No petitions for certiorari have been filed as of the time this Comment went 
to press.  
 184  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012). 
 185  See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 186  See supra Part III.A. 
 187  See supra Part III.B; see also O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, TILA Rescission Rights 
(June 20, 2012), http://www.omm.com/tila-rescission-rights-06-18-2012/ (offering a 
concise summary of the split). 
 188  See Brief of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal [hereinafter CFPB Amicus Brief] at 23–
24, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (2012) (No. 10-1442), 2012 WL 
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opinion stressed, the decision of the Eighth Circuit majority, like 
those of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, “is contrary to the plain 
language of TILA, the congressional intent behind it, and the 
position of the agency responsible for enforcing it.  TILA is ‘remedial 
legislation to be construed broadly in favor of consumers,’ yet the 
majority construes its provisions broadly in favor of lenders.”189 
Nevertheless, it is not impossible that an intentionalist 
interpretation will carry the day, given the Supreme Court’s past 
decisions.190  The Court reached a textualist-intentionalist 
compromise in Koons Buick191 and concluded Beach with a discussion 
of Congress’s “manifest intent,” even if only in dicta.192  The very 
active circuit split at the center of this Comment reveals that the 
intentionalist position is not without support.193 
Whatever its conclusion, the Court should begin by declaring 
Beach inapposite.194  Relevant only through its dicta, Beach should not 
be stretched to apply to rescission mechanics.195  Rather than expand 
the influence of its reasoning, the Court should defer to the CFPB, 
the agency now charged with TILA regulation.196  Deference is 
important in an abstract sense as a means of maintaining the 
boundaries of the different branches of government.197  With respect 
 
1074082, at *18–19.   
 189  Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 731 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 
2009). 
 190  Note that, with respect to its emphasis on legislative intent, the limited TILA 
jurisprudence explored in Part II of this Comment stands at odds with a statistically-
confirmed Court trend: “[The Court’s] practice after 1986 (when Scalia joined the 
Court) has reflected the influence of new textualism . . . . The Court has been 
somewhat more willing to find statutory plain meaning and less willing to consult 
legislative history, either to confirm or rebut that plain meaning. . . .”  ESKRIDGE, 
supra note 1, at 227. 
 191  See supra Parts II.A and III. 
 192  See supra Part II.B. 
 193  See supra Part II. 
 194  See CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at 15 (“Beach is not directly on 
point. . . .”). 
 195  “When [courts] make law in dictum, the likelihood is high that it will be bad 
law.”  Laval, supra note 115, at 1260.  See generally id. at 1258–62 (stressing that over-
reading dicta is particularly pernicious in a system based on stare decisis). 
 196  See generally Letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Assistant Professor of Law at 
Albany Law School, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y of Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve 
Sys. (Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2010
/October/20101025/R-1390/R-1390_102110_54026_556309269172_1.pdf (arguing 
the importance of allowing the CFPB to formulate a coherent regulatory scheme). 
 197  See Aaron R. Cooper, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an Era 
of Private Governance, 99 GEO. L.J. 1454–55 (2010–11) (describing judicial review of 
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to TILA rescission, moreover, the CFPB’s analysis is compelling and 
appropriately consumer-protective.198 
What the Court should not do is resolve the textualist-
intentionalist debate that has colored TILA litigation in general and 
the rescission-provision split in particular.199  The manner in which 
the circuits have articulated their decisions invites the Court to 
choose a victorious methodology.200  By resolving the less conspicuous 
issues surrounding dicta and deference, however, the Court can 
reach a decision without accepting the circuits’ implicit invitations to 
side with a particular interpretive school.201 
A.  The Scope and Applicability of Beach 
The holdings of the Supreme Court are binding upon all the 
courts of the land.  Dicta, however, are not considered binding.202  
The two can be difficult to distinguish, as the pragmatic Judge Posner 
has noted:203 “A dictum is a statement in a judicial opinion that could 
have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical 
 
agency determinations as a means of making sure that the agency is not taking an 
impermissible amount of legislative power, not as an opportunity for the Court to 
“substitute its own judgment for that of the political branch” when that political 
branch is acting within the scope of its authority). 
 198  The CFPB’s fidelity to TILA’s purposes, see supra Part I, weighs strongly in 
favor of granting deference, because it is precisely “[w]here an agency’s decision or 
interpretation of a statute violates a canon of statutory construction, or where the 
agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with the public interest patina of the original 
statute, or where a court deems the agency’s action ‘unreasonable,’ [that] the 
agency’s decisions will be accorded no deference.”  Jonathan R. Macey, Separated 
Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 Geo. 
L.J. 671, 684 (1992). 
 199  See supra Parts II and III. 
 200  See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 117, 119–31 (arguing that textualism can brook no compromise with 
intentionalist or purposovist interpretive imperatives, such that any choice other 
than pure textualism is a choice against textualism). 
 201  See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B. 
 202  See, e.g., Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012) (quoting Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)) (noting that “[i]n [the] context [of a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to AEDPA,] ‘clearly established law’ signifies ‘the 
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions’”).  
 203  Posner is far from the only dicta-theorist, but a full exploration of the hazy, 
even fluid, dictum-holding boundary is beyond the scope of the present study.  As a 
notable counterpart to Posner’s proposed workmanlike explanation of dicta is the 
gemologist-inspired approach that its creators “call the ‘Judicial Four Cs.’  Jewelers 
evaluate carat, cut, color, and clarity in assessing diamonds; we evaluate constraint, 
consideration, clarity, and candor in forming understandings of what to treat as 
holding and dicta within judicial opinions.”  Michael Abramovicz & Maxwell Stearns, 
Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1017 (2005). 
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foundations of the holding.”204  It stands apart from the opinion’s 
binding core because it “may not have received the full and careful 
consideration of the court that uttered it.”205  For Judge Posner—and 
the Seventh Circuit—”[w]hat is at stake in distinguishing holding 
from dictum is that a dictum is not authoritative.  It is the part of an 
opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to 
reject.”206  Posner thus invites us to “ask what reasons there are against 
a court’s giving weight to a passage found in a previous opinion.”207  
As Judge Posner notes, there are many potential reasons for 
disregarding dicta, “reasons for thinking that a particular passage was 
not a fully measured judicial pronouncement, that it was not likely to 
be relied on by readers, and indeed that it may not have been part of 
the decision that resolved the case or controversy on which [a 
federal] court’s jurisdiction depended.”208  Posner’s know-a-dictum-by-
its-stakes argument ties “dictumitude,” for lack of a better word, to 
reader response.209 
Not all circuits are as willing to risk jettisoning a holding along 
with the bathwater of dicta as is the Seventh Circuit.210  The Third 
Circuit explained that “[e]ven if what we read as the holdings . . . 
could be characterized as dicta and therefore not binding on us, such 
 
 204  Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 205  Id. 
 206  United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 207  Id. 
 208  Id. at 293. 
 209   Fascinatingly, the Ninth Circuit glossed Posner’s stakes-based definition in a 
parenthetical citation as one that “adopt[s] a pragmatic definition of dictum based 
upon whether the previous panel fully considered the issue and intended for future 
interpreters to rely on it.”  United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 916 (9th Cir. 
2001) (emphasis added).  This is a mischaracterization and, as subtle a misstatement 
as it may seem, it is significant inasmuch as it paints Posner’s statement with an 
intentionalist brush when, in fact, his working definition of dicta corresponds to a 
textualist approach.  See Morrell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of 
Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 20 (2003) (“[T]extualism . . . employs a reader-
centered strategy . . . for attributing meaning to a statutory text . . . . 
Intentionalism . . . employs a writer-centered strategy for attributing meaning to 
statutory text, emphasizing ‘meaning(s)’ ‘intended’ by the writer . . . .”).  Here, as 
with respect to the TILA rescission provision, the Ninth Circuit focuses on intent.  See 
infra Part IV. 
 210  The Seventh Circuit has a strong—and generalized—predilection for straight-
shooting and has stated its preference for streamlining in eminently quotable terms.  
See, e.g., DeShields v. Int’l Resort Props., 463 Fed. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not 
like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”)); see also Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982) (“We deprecate decision by 
metaphor.”).  
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dicta are highly persuasive.  Indeed, with regard to statements made 
by the Supreme Court in dicta, ‘we do not view [them] lightly.’”211  
Indeed, the circuit noted, “[b]ecause the Supreme Court uses dicta 
to help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide 
because of its limited docket . . . [t]o ignore what we perceive as 
persuasive statements by the Supreme Court is to place our rulings, 
and the analysis that underlays them, in peril.”212  The Ninth Circuit 
has also noted the predictive potential and resultant premium borne 
by Court dicta, remarking that “dicta of the Supreme Court have a 
weight that is greater than ordinary judicial dicta as prophecy of what 
that Court might hold.  We should not blandly shrug them off 
because they were not a holding.”213  The Tenth Circuit has adopted 
an even more deferential posture with respect to Supreme Court 
dicta: “we are bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by 
the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta [are] 
recent and not enfeebled by later statements.”214 
Here, however—even for those who favor expansive readings of, 
and who accord considerable deference to, Supreme Court dicta—it 
is problematic to find authoritative the Beach Court’s hypothesis as to 
Congressional intent.  Although the Beach Court did declare that it 
was respecting the “manifest intent” of Congress, it was less confident 
about congressional intent just a few lines earlier, where it discussed 
what “Congress may well have chosen.”215  The Court had already 
reached its holding based on a textual analysis before offering 
intentionalist “evidence” as supplementary support for its decision;216 
the intentionalist argument is a tack-on.  Having reached its decision 
on other grounds, the Court indulges in somewhat conflicted 
speculation regarding Congress’s intent, creating dicta.217  And, 
 
 211  Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 
548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 212  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 213  Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992).   
 214  United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
 215  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 216  The Court even marks this supplement with a revelatory introductory 
sentence: “The Act, however, has left even less to chance (if that is possible) than its 
‘expire’ provision would allow, standing alone.”  Id. at 417. Though the provision is 
enough “standing alone,” in other words, the Court will offer even more support of 
its conclusion.  See id. 
 217  Why the dicta are present is an interesting question.  They could have been 
included by compromise, to accommodate the Justices’ different perspectives.  They 
could also serve the function of keeping the textualist-intentionalist debate alive and 
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because the Court’s first statement impugns the confidence of its 
second, these dicta should be treated with caution.218 
The Tenth Circuit—and, by extension, the Eighth Circuit 
majority, which explicitly approves and adopts the Tenth Circuit’s 
reading of Beach219—does not display the requisite caution with 
respect to Beach dicta.  Although the Rosenfield court purports to 
reach a conclusion “consistent with Beach,”220 and although the Keiran 
court suggests that it is reading TILA through the lens of Beach,221 the 
Rosenfield court’s holding that “TILA establishes a right of action that is 
generally redressable only when a party seeks recognition of it by 
invoking the power of the courts”222 is clearly beyond the scope of the 
Beach court’s discussion of affirmative defenses.223 
The Ninth Circuit similarly distorted dicta in reading Beach to 
hold that “rescission suits must be brought within three years from 
the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of 
rescission is delivered within that three-year period.”224  The Ninth 
Circuit adds one and one and gets three, with the missing addend 
coming from its assumption that when the Court said “completely 
extinguish[ed]” in one context, it intended that the extinguishment be 
universal because (1) § 1635(f) is a statute of repose and (2) statutes 
 
thriving.  Or, of course, they could have been included to suggest that, even in the 
face of a clear text, an intentionalist inquiry into Congressional reasoning should be 
conducted.  See Defining Dicta, supra note 203, at 971–72. 
 218  Stanley Fish has written that “[f]iguring out what a multiple-authored text 
means is in principle no different from figuring out what a single-authored text 
means; both require the same ‘necessary construction’ of an intention that the words 
alone won’t yield up.”  Stanley Fish, Intention and the Canons of Legal Interpretation, THE 
N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 16, 2012, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/intention-and-the 
-canons-of-legal-interpretation/.  The idea of intention as a construction, of 
something substantial that is built and that can take on a presence of its own, 
independent of the words from which it was crafted, is a helpful way to understand 
how the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are able to arrive at conclusions that exceed the 
scope of Beach while purporting to flow necessarily from Beach. 
 219  Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013); see also supra 
Part III.A (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s decision at length). 
 220  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 221  See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728. 
 222  Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183 (emphasis in the original). 
 223  See, e.g., Keiran, 720 at 736 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Beach . . . did not address how a consumer 
rescinds a loan.”).  
 224  McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
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of repose mean sue or see the right extinguished.225  Not only does 
Beach never mention statutes of repose, but there are many statutes of 
repose that do not require filing suit.226  The Ninth Circuit’s syllogism 
is thus flawed. 
The three circuits that have read Beach as controlling have done 
so by guessing what the Court intended to say and by applying what 
the Court did say on one topic to a discrete issue.  The Court should 
declare Beach inapposite even if it agrees that borrowers must file to 
rescind.227  A determination that filing is necessary should be reached 
through case-specific analysis; it should not be the child of chance, 
the results of a fortuitous misapplication of dicta.228  If the Court 
holds that Beach applies, it would implicitly condone using 
perceptions of its own intent as a proxy for legislative intent.229  As 
one student commentator notes, “[i]n a dire economic atmosphere 
where predatory lending has contributed to widespread home 
foreclosures, courts should not take it upon themselves to speculate 
on alternative theories of congressional intent, especially when the 
purpose, history, and letter of the law are so clear.”230 
 
 225  See id. at 1329. 
 226  See the CFPB’s excellent discussion of statutes of repose, CFPB Amicus Brief, 
supra note 188, at *20–24.  The CFPB’s analysis is discussed infra Part IV.B. 
 227  Thomas L. Fowler’s astute analysis of the risks posed by overstated dicta in an 
unrelated case captures general principles of jurisprudence that should guide the 
Court in its ultimate resolution of TILA rescission: 
The analysis and the language chosen by the Court in Fly obscure the 
normal guideposts that lower courts use to make this holding versus 
dictum determination. As a result, the lower courts will be encouraged 
to abandon the difficult determination of what the law is and instead 
substitute the determination of what the law will be based upon the 
various statements found in the opinion without regard to whether 
such statements are holding or dictum. 
Thomas L. Fowler, Of Moons, Thongs, Holdings and Dicta: State v. Fly and the Rule of 
Law, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 253, 259 (2000). 
 228  See generally id. at 296–302 (discussing why it is important to maintain clear 
boundaries between dicta and holdings). 
 229  See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1998).  For an excellent 
cautionary tale regarding the perils and pitfalls of trying to divine the Court’s intent, 
see Brian J. Dunne, Comment, Enforcement of the Medicaid Act Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
after Gonzaga University v. Doe: The “Dispassionate Lens” Examined, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
991, 1003–12 (2007) (studying the methodological conflicts in the wake of the 
Court’s decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)).  As Dunne 
notes, “While Gonzaga no doubt commands a text-focused analysis in determining § 
1983 enforceability of Medicaid Act provisions, lower courts have divided into two 
distinct camps regarding the proper ‘type’ of textual analysis.”  Id. at 1003.  
 230  Michael Sabet, Comment, Slamming the Door in the Consumer’s Face: Courts’ 
Inadequate Enforcement of TILA Disclosure Violations and the False Hope of a Foreclosure 
Defense, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 183, 210 (2010). 
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B. An Alternative: Look to the CFPB 
Even without heeding Sabet’s exhortation to look solely to the 
letter of the law, however, the Court need not resort to mangling the 
square Beach peg until it fits into the round hole of TILA rescission 
mechanics.  There is highly persuasive authority available to aid in 
interpreting § 1635(f) and Regulation Z: the CFPB. 
The CFPB’s responsibilities include “[w]riting rules, 
supervis[ing] companies, and enforc[ing] federal consumer financial 
protection laws.”231  “Congress granted the [CFPB] the authority to 
interpret and promulgate rules regarding TILA.”232  “With the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, [it] transferred this authority from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Bureau on July 21, 
2011.”233 
Aggressively asserting its authority over TILA, the CFPB 
“welcome[s] . . . suggestions of pending cases that might make good 
candidates for the amicus program.”234  The Bureau’s amicus program 
has filed briefs in each rescission case.235  The CFPB’s interventionist 
policy matches the latitude Congress explicitly granted to the 
executive branch—the branch it tasked with determining how to 
enforce the Act.236  Congress has passed the baton of TILA regulation 
from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB and, with it, this 
regulatory latitude. 
 
 
 231  CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-
bureau/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
 232  CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *3 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(12)(O), 
5512(b)(1), 5581(b)(1)). 
 233  Id. (citing Pub L. No. 111-243, §§ 1061(b)(1), (d) (2010), codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5581(b)(1), (d) (2010)); Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57, 252 (Sept. 20, 
2010). 
 234  CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov
/amicus/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
 235   See Robert Bostrom, CFPB Files Amicus Brief in TILA Case, Says More To Come, 
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 12, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=40012926-2522-457b-99bc-f182dd385d7f  (“The Bureau sees the filing 
of amicus briefs as an important way to ensure that the statutes it oversees are 
correctly and consistently interpreted by the courts, even in cases in which the CFPB 
is not itself a named party.”). 
 236  See supra Part I (discussing how Congress has transferred TILA regulation 
from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB).  It is only logical that the same 
regulatory leeway transfers as well.  The question of whether judicial deference passes 
is more complex.  See infra pp. 34–35. 
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In its amicus briefs,237 the CFPB argues that “[t]he language of § 
1635 is plain: Within three years of loan consummation, consumers 
must exercise their right of rescission by notifying their lender that they 
are doing so.”238  The CFPB adds that, “[i]f there were any ambiguity 
in that mandate, Regulation Z resolves it by also specifying that 
consumers exercise the right to rescind by providing written notice to 
the lender.”239  Because there is no room for confusion, in other 
words, inquiry should begin and end with the text. 
Ironically, if the CFPB is correct that the regulation is 
unambiguous, there is less reason for the Court to defer to it: If the 
regulation is clear, the Court will apply it without consulting the 
regulatory agency.240  If, on the other hand, the Court finds 
Regulation Z unclear, it will have to address whether and to what 
extent administrative deference has shifted from the Board to the 
Bureau,241 just as it will need to discuss the deference due to a 
position expounded in an amicus brief.242  These complicated treks 
 
 237  The CFPB’s amicus briefs feature identical standards sections and differ only 
in applying the standards to the particular facts of each case.  See CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/amicus/ (last visited Aug. 
30, 2013) (collecting the CFPB amicus briefs). 
 238  CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *10. 
 239  Id. 
 240  See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1663, 
146 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2000) 
(Noting, with respect to Auer deference, but in terms general enough to apply to 
agency deference in general: “[D]eference is warranted only when the language of 
the regulation is ambiguous . . . . To defer to the agency’s position [with respect to 
an unambiguous regulation] would be to permit the agency, under the guise of 
interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation”). 
 241  See TROUTMAN SANDERS, http://www.troutmansanders.com/judicial-deference-
to-agencys-interpretation-of-tila-reaches-new-high-water-mark-02-01-2011/ (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2012) (“When authority over TILA interpretation transfers to the new CFPB, 
presumably this judicial deference to the agency interpretation will follow. For this 
and other reasons, there should be no wonder why the struggle over the creation of, 
and the new leadership for, and the role of Congressional over[sight] over, the CFPB 
was and is such a hot topic in Washington.”).  See also Melanie E. Walker, Comment, 
Congressional Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1341, 1361–66 (1999) (exploring the implications for judicial deference when 
Congress transfers authority from one agency to another). 
 242  Particularly relevant to determining the level of deference due the CFPB in 
this matter is “Skidmore deference,” which recognizes that “the rulings, 
interpretations and opinions of the [relevant federal agency], while not controlling 
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”  
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  “The weight of such a judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
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through the murky waters of deference rules will only be necessary if 
the Court determines that the regulation is ambiguous.243 
Even without the benefit of formal deference, however, the 
CFPB’s arguments are persuasive because they advance both TILA’s 
consumer-protective purpose and public policy. “Congress enacted § 
1635,” the Bureau notes, “in response to fraudulent home-
improvement schemes in which ‘homeowners, particularly the poor,’ 
were ‘trick[ed] . . . into signing contracts at exorbitant rates, which 
turn out to be liens on the family residences.’”244  To require that 
borrowers sue “is contrary to the plain language of the provision and 
contravenes the purpose of the statutory scheme to provide 
consumers a private, non-judicial mechanism to rescind mortgage 
loans.”245  Indeed, the CFPB regards rescission as a means of avoiding 
litigation and conserving “valuable judicial resources.”246  If a lender 
wishes to challenge a borrower’s rescission, then the lender can sue 
to determine “whether rescission was accomplished because the party 
was entitled to rescind in the first instance.”247  The CFPB’s 
interpretation places the onus of filing a complaint on the lender, 
who is presumably more sophisticated and better able to assess the 
wisdom of litigation than the borrower.  This is a more socially 
responsible position than the suit requirement, which would reward 
inaction on the part of lenders and force borrowers into court, 
 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”  Id.  
According to Skidmore, the fact that the agency’s determination is presented not 
through the adversarial system but, rather, through an amicus brief is no reason to 
discount it as persuasive authority.  See id. at 139–40. 
 243  As the Court recently stated,  
[w]e need not decide which party’s interpretation is more persuasive, 
however; both are plausible, and the text alone does not permit a more 
definitive reading.  Accordingly, we find Regulation Z to be ambiguous 
as to the question presented, and must therefore look to the Board’s 
own interpretation of the regulation for guidance in deciding this case.  
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011).  When Chase was 
decided, the CFPB had not yet assumed control of regulating TILA.  See, e.g., 
MARYLAND DEP’T OF LABOR LICENSING AND REGULATION, 
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/advisories/advisorycfpb.shtml (last visited Aug. 
30, 2013) (noting that the CFPB became operational in the week of July 28, 2011); see 
also Chase, 131 S. Ct. at 871 (providing a decision date of January 24, 2011). 
 244  CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *4 (quoting 90 CONG. REC. H14384 
(daily ed. May 22, 1968) (statement of Rep. Sullivan)) (citing 90 CONG. REC. H14388 
(statement of Rep. Patman)). 
 245  Id. at *25. 
 246  Id. at *5. 
 247  Id. at *16. 
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discouraging private settlement and rendering notice superfluous.248 
The Court should apply the CFPB’s sound interpretation of 
TILA’s rescission provision.  In this way, the Court would respect both 
the plain language enacted by the legislature, to which the CFPB 
adheres, and Congress’s intent to allow the executive branch to fill 
TILA’s broad outlines with the details of enforcement.  As the 
Hartman concurrence sagely observes, “caution requires attentiveness 
to the views of the administrative entity appointed to apply and 
enforce a statute,” and “deference is especially appropriate in the 
process of interpreting [TILA] and Regulation Z,” unless such 
deference would lead to “demonstrably irrational” results.249  It could 
well be that the policy advocated by the CFPB will prove disastrous,250 
 
 248  See Sabet, supra note 230, at 210–11.  If the consumers’ right to sue expires 
after three years, then there is a perverse incentive for lenders to ignore borrowers’ 
notices of rescission or, perhaps worse, to respond to them in a misleading, string-a-
long manner, so that borrowers miss the three-year filing limit.  See generally id.; see 
also CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *19. 
 249  Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring) 
(quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980)). 
Judge Melloy is alone in advocating agency deference in this case.  The CFPB filed its 
first rescission-provision brief in Rosenfield.  The Tenth Circuit’s only reference to the 
CFPB’s brief is relegated to a footnote and does not address agency deference.  See 
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We 
acknowledge receipt of two amicus curiae briefs, one filed by the [CFPB], a federal 
regulatory agency . . . .  Although these briefs largely cover the same terrain as the 
parties’ arguments, they are helpful.  We do exercise appropriate care, however, to 
keep our primary focus on the parties’ arguments.”  (citations omitted)).  The Third 
Circuit barely gave the CFPB a passing nod in Sherzer; it certainly did not raise the 
question of deference.  See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 257 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (“The Sherzers and their amicus, the [CFPB] argue that [notice 
suffices].”).  The Keiran majority, Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 
(8th Cir. 2013), refers to the CFPB’s amicus brief, but does not mention deference; 
the Keiran dissent does not even mention the brief.  To keep track of CFPB amicus 
filings, see CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 237. 
 250  The fear of the dangers of cloudy title underlies the Tenth Circuit’s decision, 
see supra Part III.A.  It is also of great concern to the three vast banking organizations 
that banded together to file an amicus brief in the Rosenfield case.  Brief of the Amici 
Curiae Am. Bankers Assoc., Consumer Bankers Assoc., and Consumer Mortgage 
Coalition in Support of Appellees at 9, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (No. 
10-1442), 2012 WL 1656043, at *2 (arguing that allowing mere notice to trigger 
rescission “would cast a long shadow of uncertainty over the housing finance market, 
a market that depends on certainty and predictability.  The price for that uncertainty 
would fall squarely on the very individuals that TILA was meant to benefit—
borrowers.”).  The banking associations’ brief also points to potential injustice that 
rescission-by-notice could work upon lenders: notice-triggered rescission “would 
allow a borrower to strip a lender who complied with TILA of its security interest 
instantaneously and unilaterally.”  Id.  Aaron B. Millar paints the potential 
consequences to lenders in vivid detail: “Imagine this scenario: Hours before the 
foreclosure sale, the mortgage lender receives a fax from the defaulting borrower’s 
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but this is not a foregone conclusion.251  This politicized matter is best 
left to the executive and, thus, at least theoretically, to the collective 
will of the voting public.252  By respecting the regulatory power that 
Congress conferred upon the executive, moreover, the Court would 
satisfy the mandates of both textualism and intentionalism in a way 
that holding Beach to govern would not.253 
V. CONCLUSION 
Resolution of TILA’s rescission requirements is but a cert-
seeking petition away.  Because (1) TILA’s stated aim is one of 
consumer protection, (2) Congress built room into TILA to allow the 
government to adapt Regulation Z to the deceptive practices of 
creditors, and (3) the plain language of Regulation Z suggests that 
notice triggers rescission, the Court should hold that borrowers may 
rescind by notifying lenders of their intent to do so. 
In reaching this determination, the Court will not need to defer 
to the CFPB’s interpretation of the statute.  The CFPB’s policy 
arguments are compelling on their own terms.  While the textualist 
 
lawyer stating that the borrower rescinds the loan . . . because the finance charge in 
the loan disclosures was understated by $36.”  Aaron B. Millar, The Mortgage Lender’s 
Primer on a TILA Rescission Claim, 25 UTAH B. J. 40, 40 (2012). 
 251  See CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *18–19 & n.4 (countering the 
objections raised by the Bankers’ Associations—see supra note 250—by stressing that 
requiring notice within the three-year period alerts the lender to the customer’s 
rescission and allows the lender to contest the rescission, at which point the borrower 
would have a finite period of time—that the courts will have to determine—to file 
suit); see also Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 263–67 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(analyzing the policy implications of rescission-by-notice at length and concluding 
that, though this method of rescission could create some complications, these 
complications did not constitute a “reason to disregard the text of the statute” and 
that “it is for Congress—not the courts—to determine” such policy matters). 
 252  One scholar argues that the judiciary should only make determinations with 
regard to policy choice in the absence of both statutory clarity and any indicia of 
legislative and/or political preferences and that, even under those circumstances, 
“the judiciary should exclude those policy preferences it is confident could not get 
enacted in the current political process.”  EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: 
HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 234 (2008).  Given that the CFPB is a 
creature of the current political regime, the Court should hesitate to adopt an 
interpretation diametrically opposed to the one that the CFPB proposes.  See also 
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163–66 (1982) (arguing 
that the formerly antimajoritarian role formerly played by courts as makers of the 
common law should be restricted to matters of constitutional adjudication in light of 
the proliferation of statutes and the resultant change in the nature of law-making in 
this country). 
 253  See Mullins, supra note 209, at 31 (suggesting that modern theoretical 
approaches to statutory construction “recognize that neither ‘textualism’ nor 
‘intentionalism’ provide, by themselves, a satisfactory theory”).   
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courts, true to the methodology they espouse, declined to season 
their analyses with sociopolitical considerations, the CFPB showed no 
such reluctance.  The CFPB explained in convincing detail how the 
notice-only requirement fits both TILA’s stated purpose and the 
hardships borrowers currently face. 
Even if the Court should determine that one must sue to 
rescind, however, it should decline to massage the boundaries of 
precedent.  The Court should declare Beach inapplicable to rescission 
mechanics.  By analyzing the provision independently of its earlier 
decision, the Court should confirm that its non-binding conjecture as 
to Congressional intent cannot be substituted for inquiry into 
Congressional intent. 
Although the Court should take the intentionalist Circuits to 
task for misrepresenting dicta as precedent, the Court should not 
frame its correction as a condemnation of intentionalism.  The 
current split appears to be a textualist-intentionalist tussle, but victory 
need not and should not be tied to a mode of analysis.  The 
multiplicity of methodologies that led to the feisty Koons Buick 
opinion keeps statutory construction lively and staves off wooden 
positivism.  Ideally, analytical sparks will fly again when the Court 
decides the rescission-provision split. 
 
